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The Creation of Daoism 
PAUL FISCHER 
Abstract 
This paper examines the creation of Daoism in its earliest, pre-Eastern Han peri-
od. After an examination of the critical terms “scholar/master” (zi 子) and “au-
thor/school” (jia 家), I argue that, given the paucity of evidence, Sima Tan and 
Liu Xin should be credited with creating this tradition. The body of this article 
considers the definitions of Daoism given by these two scholars and all of the 
extant texts that Liu Xin classified as “Daoist.” Based on these texts, I then sug-
gest an amended definition of Daoism. In the conclusion, I address the recent 
claim that the daojia 道家/daojiao 道教 dichotomy is false, speculating that disa-
greement over this claim arises from context in which Daoism is considered: 
among the other pre-Qin “schools of thought” or among other world religions. 
 
Daoism is of fundamental importance to East Asian intellectual history, 
its influence pervasive across a broad spectrum of cultural endeavors, 
from cosmogony and art to politics and health. For two and a half mil-
lennia, it has never been far from the collective mind of China’s long line 
of scholars. It would follow, then, that the history of Daoism would more 
or less be set in stone. But in recent decades some Western scholars have 
described early, “philosophical” Daoism in rather non-traditional ways 
that have left some of us puzzled. In this article, I describe the creation of 
Daoism, while arguing against some modern depictions and insinuations, 
and for a new definition (albeit based squarely on the old one). My in-
tended audience consists, I hope, of peers, colleagues, and students, with 
the intention of facilitating a few friendly conversations on this sublime 
and robust philosophy. Among the great traditions studied in Western 
academia, I think “philosophical Daoism” has been relatively under-
appreciated, and still awaits its proper place in our ever-more-globalized 
2 / Journal of Daoist Studies 8 (2015)   
 
aesthetic. Perhaps the growing rapprochement with China will soon fa-
cilitate a higher profile for this tradition in the West. 
 In this essay, I first present a context for the creation of Daoism by 
examining two important terms, often translated as “master” and 
“school.” These are important because putative masters narrate, write, 
and/or transmit texts within ostensible schools of thought, of which Dao-
ism is of course only one. Then I present the two earliest definitions of 
Daoism, those given by its creators, Sima Tan 司馬談 (d. 110 BCE) and 
Liu Xin 劉歆 (46 BCE-23 CE), two early scholars well known to sinolo-
gists. Next, I analyze the earliest collection of books to be labeled 
“Daoist.” I include here the nine fragmented texts that have received less 
attention than the six received texts of this tradition. These latter two sec-
tions may be thought of as the theory and practice of early Daoism. Last, 
I argue for an amended description of Daoism, in which I revise the ear-
lier definitions with a few ideas gleaned from the texts they purport to 
describe.  
 I might begin with the first thing many of us tell undergraduates in 
our Daoism courses. Which is: there is no such thing as Daoism. While 
the terms “Dao” and “ism” exist in Chinese, there is no such word as 
“Daoism” in Chinese: it is a Western invention. There only is, and only 
ever has been, daojia 道家 (literally, “Daoist school” but usually rendered 
“philosophical” or “literati Daoism”) and at least a dozen kinds of daojiao 
道教 (literally “Daoist teachings” but usually translated as “religious” or 
“organized Daoism”).1 There are also other objects of inquiry that might 
                                                          
 1 Some people now prefer to translate daojia as “early” or “classical” Daoism, 
but I retain the older translation for three reasons. 1. It mirrors the fact that in 
China daojia is taught in Philosophy Departments and daojiao in Religion De-
partments. 2. While I agree with the complication that most ancient philosophies 
are somewhat religious and most ancient religions are somewhat philosophical, 
the common usage of the term “philosophical” is simply “a system of thought,” 
which works well here. 3. “Early” and “classical” are both temporal terms that 
inevitably lead to confusion. For example, when Wang Bi 王弼 (226-249) and Guo 
Xiang 郭象 (d. 312) spoke of the Dao, they were certainly not referring to the Dao 
“revealed” to Zhang Ling 張陵 (d. 156) in “sacred scriptures” brought to him by 
a “heavenly being” a century before. The first half of the “daojia/literati-
daojiao/organized” locution seems a good choice, but “organized” or “commu-
nal” Daoism implies that there is no difference in content (only in social organi-
zation), whereas I will argue in the conclusion that the difference is significant. A 
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be put under the umbrella of Daoism: “transcendence Daoism” (also 
known as “immortality Daoism”) say, or Huang-Lao Daoism. Some ar-
gue that some or all of these things do constitute a coherent entity that 
might be called “Daoism,” (or, in recognition of this being a modern con-
struct, “Taoism”), because “they all follow the Dao,” but this is like 
claiming that Christianity and Islam are the same thing because they 
both worship “God.” It may be true in some essential or meta-sense, but 
it is historically inaccurate and I suspect it obscures more than it clarifies. 
At any rate, this article deals only with the earliest of the several things 
that may or may not constitute a unified “Daoism”: philosophical Dao-
ism. There are no gods or priests, liturgies or confessions of sin here; all 
that lies outside the purview of this essay. The temporal and geograph-
ical scope of this article, already hinted at in the title, is the five hundred 
years prior to the common era in China.  
 
Context 
There is ambiguity in the terms “scholar/master” and “author/school” in 
early China, and this ambiguity sometimes leads to the idea that masters 
(with students) and schools (with lineages) were the norm. But if we 
keep in mind that not all scholars were masters, with implied students or 
disciples, and not all authors engendered schools of thought that trans-
mitted what they said or wrote, then we will not automatically see social 
organizations where there may have been none. That these two Chinese 
words have these four English translations should be uncontroversial, 
but let me nevertheless provide some examples for clarification.  
 When Shizi 尸子 (ca. 390-330) lists six masters and their talking 
points he clearly has in mind their status as the progenitors of lineages 
                                                                                                                                  
“daojia/literati-daojiao/religious” taxonomy makes sense to me, but I retain “phil-
osophical” in this paper for four (admittedly rather marginal) reasons. 1. It is 
already established, and I find the arguments to disestablish it unconvincing. 2. It 
tracks the way it is taught in academia (at least in China—American philosophy 
departments by and large remain shamefully Euro-centric). 3. “Literati” is a so-
cio-economic term, so while anyone can sometimes be “philosophical,” it sounds 
slightly classist to refer to an uneducated person as “literati-ish.” 4. “Philosophi-
cal/religious” highlights the lack/abundance of supernatural elements in the two 
systems more clearly than “literati/religious.” I will return to this puzzlingly con-
tentious issue in my conclusion. 
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with specific ideas transmitted across time.2 Yet the Lüshi chunqiu 呂氏春
秋 (ca. 241 BCE) uses a similar list of people, in a similar context, and 
refers to them not as masters but as individuals.3 Further, Kongzi 孔子 
(551-479) is the best-known master in Chinese history and the titular zi 
typically implies his status as a master, with many students. However, as 
the Shiji 史記 (Scribal Records) documents, dozens of his top students 
were also called zi, and no one takes this to mean that they all necessarily 
had students of their own (ch. 67; Nienhauser 1994, 63-85). Thus, the pro-
tagonists in the story of the creation of Daoism should be conceived as a 
group of scholars, some of whom attracted students that passed on their 
teachings. 
 The semantic range of “scholar” (zi) and “author” (jia) overlap, in 
English as in Chinese, given that the former may imply—but does not 
necessitate—the latter.4 One way to accommodate this is to translate ei-
ther, in certain contexts, as “expert” (see Petersen 1995). Nevertheless, a 
more contentious issue lies in the other direction: the degree to which 
“author” can also mean “school [of thought].” I think it can mean either. 
No one assumes that jia as “school” refers to a physical school building 
or even to something that one might “attend.” The sticking point seems 
to be over whether or not it can be any kind of social institution.  
 Thus, in the case of daojia, it is incontestable that there were a num-
ber of Daoist authors—even if they did not self-identify as “Daoist,” since 
                                                          
 2 Shizi 10 (dat. 330 BCE): “Mozi valued impartiality, Kongzi valued public-
mindedness, Huangzi valued centeredness, Tianzi valued equanimity, Liezi val-
ued emptiness, Liaozi valued dispelling closed-mindedness. Their students mu-
tually denied each other, stopping [only] after several generations: [but] all were 
trapped in selfishness.” 
 3 Lüshi chunqiu 17.7 (dat. 241 BCE): “If you heed the arguments of a multi-
tude of individuals as a means of ordering the state, it will be endangered in no 
time. How does one know that this is so? Lao Dan esteemed softness; Kongzi, 
benevolence; Mo Di, wholeness; Gatekeeper Yin, purity; Liezi,  emptiness; Tian 
Pian, equanimity; Yang Zhu, the self; Sun Bin, strategic position; Wang Liao, go-
ing first; and Ni Liang, going last.” Slightly modified from Knoblock and Riegel 
2000, 433. 
 4 This is why the zhuzi 諸子 (many masters) are often the same as the baijia 
百家 (hundred authors). This is also why it is no exaggeration to speak of a baijia 
in early China: there certainly were a hundred, or hundreds, of authors, even 
while there were clearly not that many schools. 
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the term had not yet been invented—but what do we mean when we say 
there was a Daoist school? I am content with “school” insofar as it implies 
“school of thought,” because this English phrase does not necessarily 
imply any social institution. There may be a “school of thought” in this 
country that holds that cooking with butter is better than cooking with 
oil, but this does not necessarily mean that its “members” get together on 
Tuesday evenings to discuss the matter.5 With Daoism, all evidence that 
the authors of Daoist texts ever congregated as such is ambiguous.6 On 
the other hand, somebody wrote those texts, and somebody put in the 
                                                          
 5 Several scholars have recently argued that “school” is too “confusing” or 
“misleading” a translation for jia. However, their arguments are either overstat-
ed—insisting or implying that a “school (of thought)” must denote a textual line-
age, which I contend, by appeal to ordinary English usage, it does not—or are 
undermined by the unstated necessity of using some other phrase synonymous 
with “school (of thought).” Peterson uses “areas of thought” or “kinds of special-
ists” (1995, 36-37). Queen uses “intellectual tendencies” (2001, 56n14). Smith has 
“traditions” (2003, 138), “conceptual areas,” and “people with a particular ideol-
ogy” (2003, 148). Csikszentmihalyi and Nylan speak of “individuals and their 
methods” (2003, 65) and “experts in a particular discipline, technique, or field” 
(2003, 69). These scholars remind us to conceive of these schools of thought as 
retrospective categories that unite scholars who may not have belonged to an 
eponymous social organization—as with the “school of thought” that prefers 
butter to oil, or Dalmatians to Dachshunds—but this caveat is far easier to coun-
tenance than the dismissal of the term “school” altogether. A final example. The 
opening sentence of the last article states: “One major obstacle to understanding 
the early history of China is the still-prevalent notion that discrete schools of 
thought contended in the Warring States and Han periods, and that these schools 
of thought were text-centered.” While I agree with this sentence as it stands, if 
one were to remove “discrete” and change “centered” to, say, “influenced,” then 
I must disagree. 
 6 Harold Roth has spent much of his career presenting evidence for a social 
organization in early Daoism. I find his arguments interesting and compelling 
but ultimately speculative and hence, not “unambiguous.” By “speculative” I 
mean, it is a fact that some early Daoist texts refer to self-cultivation, and it fol-
lows that actual people practiced such self-cultivation. Still, it is less clear that 
such people congregated to practice these techniques (though this is not an unrea-
sonable assumption), or that they congregated as self-identified Daoists (though, 
again, they may have). In any case, Roth argues for the existence of a particular 
strand within Daoism, while in this article I seek to define it as a whole. For one 
early instance of his work in this area, see Roth (1991).  
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effort to transmit them over the past two and a half millennia. So, while I 
do not argue for early Daoism as a social entity, I would not argue 
against it either.7  
 The term jia as “author/expert” goes back at least to Zhuangzi 莊子 
(ca. 300 BCE)8 and Han Feizi 韩非子 (ca. 250 BCE).9 This use is later re-
flected in Liu Xin’s library catalog (6 BCE), famously reprinted with only 
minor alterations by Ban Gu 班固 (32-92) in his own catalog (90 CE). But 
Sima Tan certainly was not referring to six “authors” or “experts” when 
he formulated his “Six schools” (liu jia 六家). As has been noted else-
where, these six “schools” were of at least two types: those with known 
lineages, and those presumably without.10 It should also be repeated that 
Sima Tan’s “Six schools” is not a comprehensive account of the intellec-
tual climate of the time, because he specifically says that he was discuss-
ing these schools due to their views on government. Thus, of the total 
possible number of schools extant in his day, these six, to his mind, were 
the ones that had views on government that he wished to discuss. And 
although Sima Tan’s list of schools is often considered to be the earliest, 
there is reason to think that he may have drawn upon precedent, as the 
                                                          
 7 I hope the hackneyed assertion “absence of evidence is not evidence of 
absence” might still apply here. 
 8 Zhuangzi 25: “Little Knowledge said, ‘Jizhen’s “no one does it” and Jiezi’s 
“something causes it”: of these two expert’s/author’s theories, which is true to his 
situation and which is (merely) partial in his order (of things)?’” Watson 1968, 
292; Graham 1981, 152; Mair 1994, 265 all translate jia as “school.” Legge 1962, 
129 and  Ziporyn 2009, 111 avoid translating it altogether; but Guo 1961, 915 cites 
Cheng Xuanying’s 成玄英 (fl.631-652) Zhuangzi shu 莊子疏 as referring to them as 
“two worthy people” (er xian ren 二賢人) from Jixia 稷下; at any rate, it is clear 
from context that these are two people or two authors, not two “schools”. The 
Zhuangzi, like most early Chinese texts, coalesced over time with multiple au-
thors and editors; I will not attempt to date this particular passage (and remain 
not entirely persuaded by other well-known attempts to parse the text). 
 9 Hanfeizi 43 (dat. 240 BCE): “Someone asked: ‘Shen Buhai and Gongsun 
Yang: (regarding) the doctrines of these two experts/authors, whose is more ur-
gent for the state?’” Liao 1959, 212 translates jia as “authorities.” 
 10 These may well be indicated in the first paragraph in Shiji 3289, where he 
uses ruzhe 儒者 and mozhe 墨者 but fajia 法家, mingjia 名家, daojia 道家, and 
yinyang zhishu 陰陽之術. 
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Yinwenzi 尹文子 has a matching list of five.11 Thus, we should probably 
translate zi first as “scholar” and only secondarily as “master,” if we have 
evidence of students (or make it clear that “scholar” and “master” derive 
from the same word in classical Chinese). We also need to keep in mind 
the three meanings of jia (author; loosely-defined school of thought; and 
later: teacher-student lineage school) in these contexts and translate ac-
cordingly. 
 The context within which Daoism was created, then, was one of 
great intellectual ferment. There were many scholars (the zhuzi) with 
more or less specific philosophical positions, a good number of which 
had written texts (the baijia). Some of these scholars attracted students 
while others did not. Thus, when it seemed helpful to group some of the-
se scholars into categories, called “schools of thought” (jia 家), some had 
lineages of students while others did not. Yet, as helpful as these group-
ings may have been, they must be seen as generalizations, and not as 
discrete entities. They overlapped with each other and splintered within 
one another. Correlativists (Yin-Yang jia 陰陽家) did not have a monopo-
ly on Yin-Yang ideology or correlative thinking, nor Ruists (Ru jia 儒家) 
on filiality or loyalty, Mohists (Mo jia 墨家) on hiring worthies or anti-
aggression, Designatists (Ming jia 名家) on correctly designating titles or 
actions, Legalists (Fa jia 法家) on having laws or using rewards and pun-
ishments, or Daoists (Dao jia) on the Dao or changing in response to 
things.12 Schools of thought also split, as Han Feizi famously noted (ch. 
50; Watson 1964, 119). It was within such a vibrant intellectual matrix as 
this that Sima Tan and others first made their school distinctions. 
 
Theory 
Sima Tan was the first person we know of to define Daoism. Thus, since 
the Daoist authors later identified as such by Liu Xin did not, as far as we 
know, self-identify as “Daoist,” and even though the earlier author of the 
Yinwenzi plainly implied the category, we may say that Sima Tan created 
                                                          
 11 Xu 1996, 6. Li 2011, 17-19 argues that the relevant section of the Yinwenzi 
predates Sima Tan. 
 12 Though “Correlativist” and “Designatist” are unlovely translations, they 
are the best I currently know of, and succeed only in signaling the focus on cor-
relative thinking in the former and on designating titles and actions in the latter. 
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Daoism. That is, although the Yinwenzi may be the earliest text to implic-
itly identify a school of thought called Daoism, we may say that Sima Tan 
created it by explicitly defining it. Sima Tan’s definition is well-known, 
but bears repeating. I have analyzed twelve specific precepts from the 
two places where he describes this nascent school (Shiji 130.3289, 3293). If 
you are a successful Daoist, then: 
 1. your quintessential spirit should come together in unity (jingshen 
zhuanyi 精神專一); further below, we are recommended to stabilize our 
spirit (ding shen 定神), which I take to be the same thing; 
 2. your actions should harmonize with the formless (donghe wuxing 
動合無形); 
 3. you should feel sufficient and satisfied with the myriad things 
(shanzu wanwu 贍足萬物); 
 4. you should shift and move with the seasons (yushi qianyi 與時遷
移); below it says you should have the method of no-method and (there-
by) accord with the seasons for accomplishing tasks (youfa wufa, yinshi 
weiye 有法無法，因時為業), which I take to be the same; 
 5. you should change and transform in response to things (yingwu 
bianhua 應物變化);13 below it says you should have a standard of no-
standard and (thereby) accord with things and harmonize with them 
(youdu wudu, yinwu yuhe 有度無度，因物與合), which I take to be the 
same; 
 6. you should act without contrivance, but leave nothing undone 
(wuwei… wu buwei 無為… 無不為);14 
 7. you should take emptiness (i.e., an open mind) and indetermina-
cy as the root (yi xu wu wei ben 以虛無為本); 
                                                          
 13 The final sentence of this paragraph I take to be Sima Tan describing how 
Daoists actually are, and not as goals that Daoists should strive for. “In establish-
ing practices and carrying out projects, there is nothing inappropriate; (their) 
directives are concise and easy to perform: (thus their) projects are few but 
achievements are many.”  
 14 This makes more sense in Chinese: “uncontrived” means “without arti-
fice” (wei 為 = wei 偽), and since human action is perhaps usually a calculated 
response to our environment, the injunction to act without artifice is followed by 
the caveat that this does not mean that we should withdraw from the world. On 
the contrary: we should act with it. 
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 8. you should take accordance and reliance as the means (yi yin xun 
wei yong 以因循為用); 
 9. you should have no fixed position or abiding form so that you 
can see the actual disposition(s) of the myriad things (wu chengshi, wu 
changxing, gu neng jiu wanwu zhi qing 無成埶，無常形，故能究萬物之情);  
 10. you should treat emptiness (i.e., an open mind) as the constancy 
of the way (xuzhe dao zhi chang 虛者道之常);15 
 11. you should harmonize with the great Way (he da dao 合大道); 
 12. you should not over-use your spirit or belabor your body (shen 
da yong ze jie, xing da lao ze bi 神大用則竭，形大勞則敝). 
A century later, Liu Xin (or his father) described the Daoists with three 
principles:16 
 13. you should be pure and empty in order to maintain yourself 
(qing xu yi zi shou 清虛以自守);  
 14. you should be humble and flexible in order to sustain yourself 
(bei ruo yi zi chi 卑弱以自持); 
 15. you should beware rejecting protocol and learning, and of aban-
doning goodness and propriety (juequ li xue, bing qi ren yi 絕去禮學，兼
棄仁義). 
 Here I will take the liberty of summarizing these fifteen “com-
mandments” into six: relax (#12); know contentment (#3); focus (#1); keep 
a pure and open mind (#2, 7, 10, 13, 15); be humble, flexible, and respon-
sive to your changing environment (#4, 5, 8, 9, 11, 14); and act with grace 
and perseverance (#6).17 Here we have, even before any names of Daoist 
                                                          
 15 There follow two precepts for the ruler, which I do not include in my list 
because they are not applicable to Daoists who are not rulers: “Accordance is the 
ruler’s principle. (When) the various ministers arrive together, (he) makes each 
one clarify himself.” He does this so that he can ascertain whether or not their 
claims accord with their actions. 
 16 I realize that both Sima Tan and Liu Xin had their own biases that may 
have made their descriptions less than perfectly objective. But given just how 
little we know about those biases, I am giving them the benefit of the doubt. 
 17 One might ask how many of these does a person need to follow or a text 
need to evince to be counted as “Daoist”? But such a question would surely be 
pedantic or naïve, as one might as well ask whether or not a “true” Hindu must 
read the Vedas, a “real” Muslim must pray five times a day, or an “authentic” 
Platonist must believe in reincarnation. 
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people or texts, a theoretical description of Daoism. To those familiar 
with the transmitted texts of philosophical Daoism, none of these charac-
terizations will be the slightest bit surprising.  
 
Practice 
But how does theory fit with practice? That is, how do these two earliest 
definitions of Daoism fit with the narrative of the earliest Daoist texts? 
Liu Xin is the first person we know of to create a library catalog with a 
section labeled “Daoist.” In it, he listed thirty-seven Daoist texts (Hanshu 
1732). Unfortunately, twenty of them are lost. Six of the remaining seven-
teen are more or less fully extant, with all six available in English transla-
tions. Let us briefly review these six, before moving on to the eleven that 
survive only in fragments. I follow the order given by Liu Xin. 
 1. Guanzi 管子: W. Allyn Rickett, the foremost Western scholar of 
the Guanzi, said the text is a mix of Daoist, Correlativist, Huang-Lao, and 
Legalist writings authored from the fifth to first centuries BCE (Rickett 
1985, 3, 37). The text is too long and varied to be amenable to a simple 
argument of why Liu Xin might have classified this text as Daoist; in fact, 
imperial catalogs since the Sui shu 隋書 (656 CE) classed it as Legalist. 
But the text does open with a line reminiscent of the “you should shift 
and move with the seasons” advice given above: “All those who possess 
territory and shepherd people must pay heed to the four seasons….” 
More importantly, it contains three seminal chapters on mental and 
physical self-cultivation: Xinshu shang, xia 心術上下 (Mental Techniques I, 
II) and Neiye 内業 (Inner Workings; see Roth 1999, 27). 
 2. Laozi 老子: The premier text of Daoism, and one of the greatest 
works in the “wisdom tradition” of world literature, the Laozi poetically 
discloses themes of mystery (miaoxuan 妙玄), introspection (fanben 反本), 
holding to the One (bao yi 抱一), naturalness and spontaneity (ziran 自然), 
ingenuousness (wuwei 無為), flexibility and humility (rou 柔 /ruo shui 若
水), and contentment (zhizu 知足). 
 3. Wenzi 文子: According to Paul van Els, the original Wenzi was 
extensively altered sometime between the 3rd and 5th centuries CE (van 
Els awaiting publication).18 In its basic worldview the original Wenzi was 
                                                          
 18 This argument was made possible by the 1973 excavation of a tomb in 
Dingzhou 定州 that contained fragments of what appear to be the original Wenzi. 
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similar to the Laozi, but was more amenable to traditional Ruist virtues 
and was more overtly aimed at a political ruler. The revised Wenzi, 
which is also the received Wenzi, presents an even more syncretic vision 
of Daoism and Huang-Lao thought, as it is heavily laced with revised 
passages from the Huainanzi 淮南子 (dat. 139 BCE).  
 4. Zhuangzi 莊子: The other beloved classic of undergraduate classes 
on philosophical Daoism, the Zhuangzi is a celebration of vivacious an-
ecdotes characterizing the Daoist sage. It illustrates leitmotifs of relativi-
ty (xiangdui zhuyi 相對主義 ), selflessness (wuji 無己 ), mind-fasting 
(xinzhai 心齋), and skillfulness (shulian 熟練). 
 5. Liezi 列子: A. C. Graham, who translated this work into English, 
was of the opinion that much of the received version of this text also 
dates to just after the Han dynasty (202 BCE-220 CE). Its topics, by his 
reckoning, include the smallness of humans in a vast universe, a non-
anthropomorphic Dao, the transience of life, the impossibility of know-
ing what comes after death, unending change, and the relativity of val-
ues (Graham 1960; 1990, 13). 
 6. Heguanzi 鶡冠子: Carine Defoort, in her analysis of its textual his-
tory, said that the text, although probably influenced by Huang-Lao 
thought, “fits remarkably well” with Sima Tan’s description of Daoism 
(Defoort 1997, 39). Marnix Wells, a recent translator, said “It may be 
called ‘Daoist’ in an ecumenical sense, but it articulates political pro-
grams of universal resonance” (Wells 2013, 2). Outside of its chapters on 
government and warfare,19 it speaks of cosmology (with a clear articula-
tion that everything derives from qi-substance: mobu fa yu qi 莫不發於氣), 
the role of spirits (shen 神), specific and unusual sage rulers like Cheng 
Jiu 成鳩,20 five modes (wu xing 五行) theory, and the importance of one’s 
situation/disposition (qing 情). 
 No surprises here, as all six of these texts fit comfortably within the 
framework sketched by Sima Tan. But what of the remaining eleven ti-
                                                          
 19 They belong to either or both Pang Xuan 龐煖 texts listed in the Hanshu 
catalog’s “Diplomatic” (Zongheng縱橫) or “Military Strategist” (Bingquan mou 
兵權謀) sections (Hanshu 1739, 1757; Defoort 1997, 37). These chapters do pro-
mote some rather un-Daoist ideas, like prioritizing humans over heaven, and not 
following the seasons, because they are “hard to know” (nanzhi 難知).  
 20 Taiyi 太一, interestingly, is considered a “sage ruler” by Defoort (1997, 
120), but a “god” by Wells (2013, 156). 
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tles on Liu Xin’s list? Two of them we can set aside at the outset; one due 
to its extreme brevity, the other to the fact that it was only recently exca-
vated and a transcription has not yet been published.21 Thus, I will sum-
marize my readings of nine fragmented Daoist texts.22 
 1. Yi Yin 伊尹: There are six short sections of what remains of this 
text. While the first specifies which tribes should present which tributary 
gifts to Shang King Tang 湯王 (ca. 1550 BCE), the second describes from 
where the best cooking ingredients—ape lips, phoenix eggs, and the 
like—derive. The explicit point of the latter is that if one follows the Dao 
and becomes a true Heavenly Scion, then all of these foodstuffs will be 
forthcoming as tribute, the realm will be tranquil, and the ruler’s dinner 
exquisite. The third section avers that for a ruler to follow the Dao, he 
must first practice physical self-cultivation (zhishen 治身). The fourth sec-
tion is brief and describes the nine types of administrators that King 
Tang had.23 The fifth chronicles how Yi Yin during a drought divided the 
fields and taught the people better farming methods. The last section is a 
brief, generic miscellany of stories about why a ruler should choose wor-
thy ministers and how a ruler should heed omens. Only the first half of 
this text seems particularly Daoist. 
 2. Yuzi 鬻子: The Yuzi has a dozen or more sections, depending on 
how you divide them, plus a number of sayings culled from other texts, 
like the Liezi.24 Except for the Liezi citations, it does not read like a specif-
ically Daoist text, which may be due to the fact that Liu Xin listed both a 
Daoist Yuzi and a Miscellaneous Sayings of Yuzi, and those who have re-
constructed the text have put them all together.25 It counsels rulers to 
                                                          
 21  The Xinjia 辛甲  is only a few sentences long. See Ma 2004, 2686. A 
Zhouxun 周訓 is part of the Beijing University Western Han bamboo strip collec-
tion, acquired in 2009, and is not yet published. 
 22  These reconstructions come from Ma (c.1885; 2004), except the Yuzi, 
Guanyinzi, and Huangdi ming. A “reconstructed” text is usually just a collection of 
quotations from other sources.  
 23 Some scholars think that a text called “Yi Yin and the Nine [Types of] 
Rulers” (Yi Yin jiuzhu 伊尹九主) excavated in 1973 at Mawangdui is another ver-
sion of this chapter. See Yates 1997, 38-39, 179-91. 
 24 Much of what has been reconstituted of the Yuzi derives from the Qun shu 
zhiyao 群書治要 (631 CE), but there are several other sources besides this one. 
 25 The Sayings of Yuzi (Yuzi shuo 鬻子說) is in the Miscellany (Xiao shuo 小說) 
section (Hanshu 1744).  
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appoint officials26 that are liked and respected by the people, and that 
they should operate with a degree of transparency (“make plans along 
with the people”: yuren mouzhi 與人謀之). It also notes that worthy offi-
cials are more important when the ruler is less than sagely and that rul-
ers should emulate the good kings of antiquity. Actions speak louder 
than words, rulers should make use of the way (Dao), harmony (he 和), 
faithfulness (xin 信), and goodness (ren 仁), always listening to the com-
plaints and suggestions of the people. All of this is rather standard fare 
for early Chinese scholars’ texts (i.e., zishu 子書). One line says: “Only 
after heaven was there earth, only after earth were there discriminations, 
only after discriminations was there propriety, only after propriety was 
there teaching, only after teaching was there the way, only after the way 
was there principle, only after principle were there calculations” (Zhong 
2010, 20). Placing the “way” after “propriety” and “teachings” does not 
seem particularly Daoist.27 On the other hand, the four quotes of Yuzi in 
the Liezi are about constant change, flexibility, naturalness, and the both-
er of reputation. 
 3. Guanyinzi 關尹子: Livia Kohn said that the nine chapter version of 
the received Guanyinzi is substantially a later confection, influenced by 
inner alchemical thought, that “dates to Song [960-1279] times and prob-
ably goes back to [the Quanzhen patriarch] Yin Zhiping (1169-1251),” an 
alleged descendant of Gatekeeper Yin. (1997, 87). This leaves us with on-
ly a couple of quotes each from the Zhuangzi and the Syncretist Lü shi 
chunqiu, but they contain some philosophical gems. Yin Xi 尹喜 was said 
to value purity (gui qing 貴清) and he therefore advised us to keep the 
heavenly within us intact (qi tian shou quan 其天守全), and to unify our 
nature, cultivate our qi-substance, and harmonize our virtues (yi qi xing, 
yang qi qi, he qi de 壹其性，養其氣，合其德). But he also pragmatically 
asks us to examine the reasons for things (cha qi suo yi 察其所以), rather 
than merely examine their appearance. 
 4. Gongzimou 公子牟: This only offers praise for Zhuangzi, advice to 
value life (zhongsheng 重生), and the observation that office-holding will 
                                                          
 26 Here I translate both li 吏 and shi 士 as “officials”. 
 27 I typically write “Way” when I think the referent is a Daoist cosmic prin-
ciple that comes before all else, and “way” when it seems to refer to human en-
deavors, for example, the right “way” to rule. This convention, of course, does 
not obtain in Chinese. 
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lead to power. This, in turn, may lead to wealth, which probably will 
lead to honor, arrogance, and causing offense, which may well result in 
one’s death (guan, shi, fu, gui, jiao, zui, si 官, 勢, 富, 貴, 驕, 罪, 死). 
 5. Tianzi 田子: Tian Pian 田駢 was said to value equanimity (jun 均) 
and/or equilibrium (qi 齊 ). With typical Daoist optimism, he said, 
“Changes and correspondences all have (their own) principles: rely on 
inner nature and let things be, then everything will be as it should.” 
 6. Laolaizi 老萊子: Sometimes this author is conflated with Laozi, but 
this text rails against Ruist pride and their penchant for praising the an-
cients, and is for humility, hesitance, flexibility, frugality, and not talking 
too much. In one anecdote, he acts like a child in order to amuse his aged 
parents. 
 7. Qianlouzi 黔婁子: In its current state, this is a very brief work. We 
have none of his actual words, just two descriptions of him and a certain 
Yuan Xian 原寰 refusing office to remain poor recluses. 
 8. Huangdi ming 黃帝銘: The Huangdi ming (Yellow Thearch’s In-
scription), was originally in five sections, of which it seems only one is 
now extant. This chapter is called Jinren ming 金人銘 (Bronze Statue In-
scription), because it was supposedly inscribed on the back of a metal 
statue of a person with its mouth sealed shut three times. This statue was 
located at the base of some steps in an imperial shrine. The import of the 
inscription matches both the statue itself as well as some famous lines in 
the Laozi: it is not good to talk too much. Human speech is likened to fire 
and water; both are quite useful in small amounts, but when either gets 
out of hand, then disaster follows. It also advises humility and “holding 
to the female” (zhi ci 執雌), a metaphor for humility. 
 9. Zhengzhangzhe 鄭長者 (Elder of Zheng): This is now just a brief 
story from the Hanfeizi. In it, an elder from the state of Zheng advises the 
ruler to be tranquil, uncontrived, and not showy (xujing, wuwei, er wuxian 
虛靜, 無為, 而無見), all clearly Daoist virtues. 
 These nine fragmented texts both add to the common corpus of ear-
ly Daoist literature and reinforce the picture of Daoism bequeathed us by 
Sima Tan and Liu Xin. The Guanyinzi and Zhengzhangzhe both emphasize 
tranquility (jing 靜); the Laolaizi and Huangdi ming both advise against 
too much talking; and the Tianzi values equanimity (jun 均/qi 齊): all of 
these virtues are also found in the Laozi.  
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 Perhaps the most interesting addition to the Daoist vocabulary 
comes from the Guanyinzi. Since it comes from Zhuangzi 19, it is nothing 
new to those familiar with the latter text, but I nevertheless think it bears 
repeating. He says, “Do not develop (only) the heavenly of being human, 
but develop the heavenly of Heaven (too). Developing the heavenly em-
powers life, while developing (only) the human harms life. Do not reject 
the heavenly, but do not neglect the human either—then people will 
draw near to what is true” (cf. Ziporyn 2009, 78). This means, do not rely 
solely on your conscious will to follow your natural destiny;28 remember 
to also tap into your originally good nature in order to accord with its 
creative spontaneity. If you rely on your originally good nature, then 
true virtue will effortlessly arise within you, but if you rely only on your 
knowledge and will, then your life will be impoverished. Always keep a 
connection to your originally good nature, but also develop your 
knowledge and will: in this way, everyone will come closer to the ideal 
union of poetic inspiration and prosaic deliberation. 
 The phrase “develop the heavenly of Heaven” is striking and 
unique. Guo Xiang glosses this as “to know without deliberation” (bulü 
erzhi 不慮而知), which I take to mean being open to creative spontaneity. 
This is at the center of the Daoist critique of Ruism: it may be a good 
thing to specifically articulate the way of sages so that we may follow in 
their footsteps, to an extent. But it is also absolutely crucial that we allow 
ourselves to be open to wherever it is that inspiration comes from, to 
have the freedom to follow the unintentional, the extemporaneous, the 
unself-conscious. Since no one really knows where artistic inspiration 
comes from, we might as well use the metaphor of “Heaven.”29 Only 
then can we become sagely ourselves, and not mere imitators of other 
                                                          
 28 Destiny should not be confused with fate: destiny refers to individual 
potential while fate refers to unavoidable circumstance. You can fail your destiny 
through laziness or a failure of will, but you cannot “fail” your fate. 
 29 The adjectival “heavenly” of both humans and Heaven refers to here to 
“what is best in,” much as “spiritous” (shen 神) in early Chinese texts can some-
times mean “acute” or “in the early stages of” something. Daoist Heaven is not a 
supernatural entity, but rather the active half of the heaven-earth dyad of which 
the cosmos—from our vantage point—is composed. One might also translate 
“heaven” as “nature” if one has a positive view of the natural world: “develop 
the natural within Nature….” 
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people. After all, destiny and fate vary from person to person, so self-
cultivation is necessarily a singular process. 
 
Conclusion 
The picture of Daoism painted above is, I think, relatively straightfor-
ward. Yet it has been attacked on three fronts. First, its historicity has 
been denied by scholars who, in my opinion, have a too-narrow defini-
tion of “school of thought.” My defense of it as a school (of thought), 
such as it is—since my argument rests solely on the perceived semantic 
range of the word “school”—I have already given above. A second prob-
lem arises from the fact that other terms related to Daoism came, over 
time, to accrue many other meanings, such as the Huang-Lao theory of 
government prevalent in the Han. A final problem comes from the reli-
gious (and scholars of religion), who often incorrectly construe early 
Daoism as simply an amorphous and inconsequential nonentity upon 
which later believers constructed their divine confabulations. 
 H. G. Creel describes how philosophical and religious Daoism 
might have been conflated in the first place: “The immortality cult need-
ed the shelter of a respected philosophy. Taoism was highly respected in 
Han times, and many of the sayings attributed to Lao Tzu were so am-
biguous that they could be interpreted to mean almost anything” (1970, 
20). This may have been construed as inflammatory by some. Laurence 
Thompson problematizes Creel’s description of religious Daoism as 
simply “immortality” (xian 仙 ) Daoism, acknowledging the complex 
range of beliefs and rituals old and new, borrowed and indigenous. 
However, Thompson also repeats a sentiment that was becoming popu-
lar among Western scholars of religious Daoism. He notes: “When Creel 
opines that Taoist philosophy and Taoist religion are two different ani-
mals, he is using Western categories to reduce Chinese phenomena to 
intelligibility” (1993, 19). This is only half true: the categories of daojia 
and daojiao are Chinese categories, while the nomenclature of “philo-
sophical Daoism” and “religious Daoism” are Western. Thompson sub-
sequently asserts that daojiao/religious Daoism is really the same as 
daojia/philosophical Daoism, insofar as “Once we see that transcendence 
of death is logically transcendence of those unnatural obstacles that im-
pede the operations of Tao, the apparently irreconcilable conflict be-
tween calm acceptance and techniques of avoidance is resolved” (1993, 
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21). Not quite. This is like claiming that eating a healthy diet is the same 
as cryogenically freezing yourself so that someday in the future, once 
science has figured out how to extend life quite beyond its normal limits, 
you can be thawed out to take advantage of the new techniques. Fur-
thermore, the differences between philosophical and religious Daoism 
are far more numerous than mere longevity. 
 Many other Western scholars of Daoist religions have similarly tried 
to erase the obvious line between philosophical and religious Daoism.30 
Robinet (1997, 3) notes that “this division has no significance.” Kirkland 
(1997, 73) says, “The concept of ‘philosophical Taoism’ is, to a large ex-
tent, a modern fiction….”31 Raz (2012, 7) insists that “the use of these 
terms creates a false dichotomy between two types of texts….” Komjathy 
(2013, 4) finds the division “wholly inaccurate and untenable.”32 Inas-
much as I have never met a philosopher or sinologist, Chinese or West-
ern, who would agree with this claim, this matter may well be a case, 
within Western academia, of “if all you have is a hammer, everything 
looks like a nail.”33 That is, if one works in a Religion department, then 
“Daoism” is daojiao, but if one works in a Philosophy department, “Dao-
                                                          
 30 Many, but certainly not all. For accounts that acknowledge the difference 
between philosophical and religious Daoism, see Bokenkamp 1997, 10-13, and 
Kohn 2000, xxix (though she prefers a six-stage classification scheme; see p. xxx). 
Elsewhere (Kohn 2009), she tries to elide the differences into a single narrative. 
 31 He also says that “most scholars who have seriously studied Taoism, both 
in Asia and the West, have finally abandoned the simplistic dichotomy of tao-chia 
and tao-chiao—’philosophical Taoism’ and ‘religious Taoism’” (2004, 2). 
 32 He further says that the claim of “two Daoisms”—that is, the referents of 
daojia and daojiao, in use for millennia and still current today among all Chinese 
speakers—are somehow “Victorian,” “rooted in colonialist legacies,” “endemic 
among non-specialist accounts of Daoism,” and “should be taken ipso facto as 
inaccuracy” (2013, 4-5). 
 33 Philosophers like Roger Ames, Hans-Georg Moeller, and Steve Coutinho 
routinely refer to the distinction between philosophical and religious Daoism. 
See Ames 1998, 1; Moeller 2006, ix; Coutinho 2014, 7. The latter says, “It is clear 
that the syncretist metapolitical movement to which Sima Tan belonged, daojia, 
and the religious institutions known as daojiao are significantly different.” 
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ism” is daojia. This situation makes us look like we scholars of early Chi-
na are talking past each other, which does a disservice to our students.34  
 I presume the denial of the independent existence of philosophical 
Daoism came about due to anthropologists of religion coming to accept 
the biases of the people they study, with a resultant loss of “outsider” 
objectivity. A religious Daoist, ancient or modern, may well claim that 
philosophical Daoism was just a building block in the foundation of the 
complex group of edifices that make up religious Daoism. That is, they 
may claim that they own philosophical Daoism. But religions appropriate 
things all the time. Christianity and Islam both appropriate Judaism, and 
both see themselves as building upon the (“incomplete”) foundation of 
Judaism. But that does not mean that Judaism was never an entity unto 
itself. Similarly, though philosophical Daoism does not have official 
spokespeople to come to its defense, it is simply incorrect to deny its 
very existence. I understand that religious Daoism has suffered ridicule 
at the hands of scholars who preferred philosophical Daoism to religious 
Daoism. I also understand that religious Daoism covers a variety of 
complex entities. It is also true that philosophical and religious Daoism 
share an interest in meditation (or at least mental concentration) and 
health—as do many traditions in the ancient world. However, these con-
siderations are beside the point: the differences simply vastly outweigh 
the similarities. Religious Daoism has anthropomorphic gods, ordained 
priests, temples, liturgies, community rituals, talismans, ideas of sin, con-
fession, forgiveness… in short, all of the things that make it religious. 
Philosophical Daoism has none of these. 
  I wrote this paper to bring focus to philosophical Daoism, which 
seems to be in danger of fading away in Western academia as a subject of 
inquiry. Most philosophy departments do not deal in non-Western phi-
losophy and most Religion departments focus on religious Daoism. 
Some sinologists claim that since we have no evidence of a group of 
people, with a teacher-student lineage, who self-identified as “philo-
sophical Daoists,” we should not speak of a “Daoist school.” I contend 
that early China had a great many scholars and authors (see Fischer 
                                                          
 34 Russell Kirkland says as much in his section of the “Introduction” to the 
Daoism Handbook (Kohn 2000, xv). Yet he too insists that the position taken in this 
paper is “of the deeply distorted Victorian/Confucian construct.” I hope the evi-
dence shows that my analysis is neither Victorian nor Confucian. 
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2008), some of whom were teachers with students. When people like 
Sima Tan and Liu Xin decided to organize and classify the texts these 
scholars and authors produced, they were justified in creating a (retro-
spective) Daoist school of thought based on ideological similarities. They 
coherently defined and gave thirty-seven textual exemplars of this entity.  
 I further think that the English phrase “school of thought” is a quite 
adequate and useful description of this group of authors, editors, texts, 
and transmitters, a school of thought that, while perhaps not officially 
organized, has persisted in China, East Asia, and the world and remains 
an intellectually interesting and aesthetically powerful philosophy.35 
 Recently, some religious scholars have sought to delegitimize philo-
sophical Daoism. But the salient facts remain. Despite the unfortunate 
matter of the singularity of the Western word “Daoism,” there has al-
ways only ever been daojia and, later, daojiao(s). 36  Perhaps someday 
scholars will settle on translations for these terms that are more amena-
ble to scholars of philosophy and religion alike. As I opined above, “ear-
ly Daoism” and “classical Daoism” rely on a time scheme that assumes 
daojia died when daojiao was born, which is incorrect, inasmuch as even 
today one might refer to a painting or poem or political viewpoint as 
“Daoist,” where the referent is decidedly philosophical Daoism and not 
religious Daoism. More importantly, the texts and traditions these two 
terms denote are far more different than they are the same. To be sure, 
Religious Daoists do make use of the philosophical Daoist texts, appro-
                                                          
 35 One of the best places to encounter scholars interested in philosophical 
Daoism is in the pages of the Chinese journal Daojia wenhua yanjiu 道家文化研究, 
in print since 1992. This journal, which routinely employs the distinction be-
tween daojia and daojiao, recently had an issue (#22) devoted to philosophical 
Daoism and modern life (daojia yu xiandai shenghuo 道家與現代生活). 
 36 These two terms have not always been used with perfect clarity and con-
sistency in Chinese history, but their semantic parameters were generally appar-
ent in early times and are perfectly clear in modern Chinese. Sivin 1978, 305 
briefly discusses some of the problems that these terms caused across the inter-
vening two millennia. Regarding my use of the word “later,” Schipper says 
“During the same period of the Han [i.e., the same period as Sima Qian’s use of 
daojia], we also find the name Tao-chiao [i.e., daojiao], ‘Taoist teaching,’ to refer to 
the Mysteries” (1993, 219n.16). He does not cite his source(s) for this claim, so I 
do not know what he is referring to. The “(s)” is to highlight the fact that there 
are at least a dozen kinds of religious Daoisms (not unlike other major religions). 
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priating parts of it for their own ends. But the textual metaphors often 
point to very different referents, much as Jews and Christians think very 
different things when they read about the “suffering servant.” Religious 
Daoism has several well-defined schools, multiple heavens inhabited by 
various pantheons of gods and goddesses (some of whom “resonate” 
with the bodily organs of their human adepts), revealed scriptures, secret 
rituals, alchemical potions, faith-healing, exorcisms, various and sundry 
magical abilities (which usually do not appear to be construed metaphor-
ically), and hundreds of rules. Philosophical Daoism, again, has none of 
these.  
 Philosophical Daoism is a philosophy of remaining calm yet fo-
cused, of keeping an open and pure mind, of prizing humility, tranquili-
ty, equanimity, contentment, and silence. Most importantly, it is about 
acting with grace, flexibility, perseverance, and skillfulness in response 
to an ever-changing environment, and about harmonizing the yin and 
yang of the “heavenly” and the human, of integrating the mysterious 
spark of creativity with the hard work of rational analysis. This Daoism 
is often summarized as “the harmonization of the heavenly and the hu-
man into a unity” (tian ren he yi 天人合一). It is not a harmony of the hu-
man with the divine (as with religion) or of humans among themselves 
(as with humanisms such as Daoism’s sibling rival, Ruism), but rather of 
the human individual with the natural world, which remains, somehow, 
the matrix for uncontrived inspiration. This definition, this coherent and 
interesting worldview, provides philosophical Daoism the intellectual 
matrix within and behind the historical reality of its textual corpus. 
 
Bibliography 
Ames, Roger, ed. 1998. Wandering at Ease in the Zhuangzi. Albany: State Universi-
ty of New York Press. 
Bokenkamp, Stephen. 1997. Early Daoist Scriptures. Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1997. 
Coutinho, Steve. 2014. An Introduction to Daoist Philosophies. New York: Columbia 
University Press.  
Creel, Herrlee G. 1970. What is Taoism? And Other Studies in Chinese Cultural 
 History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
                                                                     Fischer, “Creation of Daoism” / 21 
 
Csikszentmihalyi, Mark, and Michael Nylan. 2003. “Constructing Lineages and 
 Inventing Traditions through Exemplary Figures in Early China.” T’oung 
Pao 89:59-99. 
Defoort, Carine. 1997. The Pheasant Cap Master (He Guanzi): A Rhetorical Reading. 
 Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Fischer, Paul. 2008. “Authentication Studies Methodology and the Polymorphous 
Text Paradigm.” Early China 32:1-43. 
Guo Qingfan 郭慶藩. 1961 [1894]. Zhuangzi ji shi 莊子集釋. Beijing: Zhonghua. 
Graham, A. C. 1960. The Book of Lieh-tzu: A Classic of Tao. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
_____. 1981. Chuang-Tzu: The Inner Chapters. London: Unwin. 
Kirkland, J. Russell. 1997. “Varieties of Taoism in Ancient China: A Preliminary 
Comparison of Themes in the Nei Yeh and Other Taoist Classics.” Taoist Re-
sources 7.2:73-86. 
_____. 2004. Taoism: The Enduring Tradition. New York: Routledge.  
Knoblock, John, and Jeffrey Riegel. 2000. The Annals of Lü Buwei. Stanford: Stan-
ford University Press. 
Kohn, Livia. 1997. “Yin Xi: The Master at the Beginning of the Scripture.” Journal 
of Chinese Religions 25:83-139. 
_____, ed. 2000. Daoism Handbook. Leiden: Brill. 
_____. 2009. Introducing Daoism. New York: Routledge. 
Komjathy, Louis. 2013. The Daoist Tradition: An Introduction. New York: 
Bloombbury. 
Legge, James. 1962 [1891]. The Texts of Taoism: The Tao Te Ching of Lao Tzu, The 
Writings of Chuang Tzu, The T’ai Shang Tractate of Actions and Their Retribu-
tions. 2 vols. New York: Dover Publications. 
Li Rui 李锐. 2011. Zhanguo Qin Han shiqi de xuepai wenti yanjiu 战国秦汉时期的
 学派问题研究. Beijing: Beijing Shifan daxue. 
Liao Wengui. 1939. The Complete Works of Han Fei Tzu. Vol. 1. London: Arthur 
Probsthain. 
_____. 1959. The Complete Works of Han Fei Tzu. Vol. 2. London: Arthur Probsthain. 
Ma Guohan 馬國翰. 2004 [1855]. Yuhan shanfang ji yi shu玉函山房輯佚書. 4 vols. 
Yangzhou: Guanglu shushe. 
22 / Journal of Daoist Studies 8 (2015)   
 
Mair, Victor. 1994. Wandering on the Way: Early Taoist Tales and Parables of Chuang 
Tzu. New York: Bantam Books. 
Moeller, Hans-Georg. 2006. The Philosophy of the Daode jing. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
Nienhauser, William Jr. ed. 1994. The Grand Scribe’s Records, Vol.VII. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press.  
Peterson, Jens Østergård. 1995. “Which Books Did the First Emperor of Ch’in 
Burn? On the Meaning of Pai Chia in Early Chinese Sources.” Monumenta 
Serica 43:1-52. 
Queen, Sarah. 2001. “Inventories of the Past: Rethinking the ‘School’ Affiliation of 
the Huainanzi.” Asia Major 14.1:51-72. 
Raz, Gil. 2012. The Emergence of Daoism: Creation of a Tradition. New York: 
 Routledge. 
Rickett, W. Allyn. 1985. Guanzi: Political, Economic, and Philosophical Essays from 
Early China. Vol. 1. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
_____. 1988. Guanzi: Political, Economic, and Philosophical Essays from Early China. 
Vol. 2. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Robinet, Isabelle. 1997. Taoism: Growth of a Religion. Translated by Phyllis Brooks. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Roth, Harold D. 1991. “Psychology and Self-Cultivation in Early Taoistic 
Thought.” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 51.2:599-650. 
_____. 1999. Original Tao: Inward Training (Nei-yeh) and the Foundations of  Taoist 
Mysticism. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Schipper, Kristofer. 1993. The Taoist Body. Translated by Karen Duval. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
Sivin, Nathan. 1978. “On the Word ‘Taoist’ as a Source of Perplexity.” History of 
Religions 17:303-30. 
Smith, Kidder. 2003. “Sima Tan and the Invention of Daoism, ‘Legalism,’ et 
 cetera.” Journal of Asian Studies 62.1:129-56. 
Thompson, Laurence. 1993. “What is Taoism? (With Apologies to H.G. Creel).” 
 Taoist Resources 4.2:9-22. 
Van Els, Paul. Forthcoming. Master Wen: Creation, Manipulation, and Reception of a 
Chinese Philosophical Text. Leiden: Brill. 
                                                                     Fischer, “Creation of Daoism” / 23 
 
Watson, Burton. 1964. The Essential Writings of Han Fei Tzu. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
_____. 1968. The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu. New York: Columbia University 
Press. 
Wells, Marnix. 2013. The Pheasant Cap Master and the End of History. St. Petersburg, 
Fla.: Three Pines Press. 
Xu Zhongliang 徐忠良. 1996. Xinyi Yinwenzii 新譯尹文子. Taipei: Sanmin. 
Yates, Robin. 1997. Five Lost Classics: Tao, Huang-Lao, and Yin-Yang in Han China. 
 New York: Ballantine Books. 
Zhong Zhaopeng 鍾肇鵬. 2010. Yuzi jiaoli 鬻子校理. Beijing: Zhonghua. 
Ziporyn, Brook, trans. 2009. Zhuangzi: The Essential Writings with Selections from 
Traditional Commentaries. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.  
 
